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INTRODUCTION

P

RESIDENT Bill Clinton appointed unprecedented numbers and
percentages of highly qualified female and minority lawyers to the
federal bench during his initial half-term in office, substantially surpassing the records of Presidents Ronald Reagan, George Bush and
Jimmy Carter. The Clinton administration invoked an efficacious, uncontroversial selection process and filled a significant percentage of the 113
judicial openings that existed when it assumed office.
Some federal court observers questioned whether the Chief Executive
could maintain this commendable record during his presidency's third
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year. More specifically, they wondered if Republican Party control of the
United States Senate, which must approve nominees, and the impending
1996 presidential election might slow the confirmation process; reduce
the number of female and minority attorneys named; and increase the
number of appointees who are less controversial and more moderate
politically.
Now that the first session of the 104th Congress has adjourned, it is
important to analyze the Clinton administration's success in naming
judges. This Essay undertakes that effort by concentrating on the appointment of women and minorities to the federal courts. The initial section of the piece briefly explores modem judicial selection, focusing on
the policies and procedures for choosing judges, and the lawyers named,
during the Carter, Reagan and Bush presidencies.
The Essay then evaluates the judicial selection goals enunciated, the
practices employed, and the attorneys appointed, in the Clinton administration's third year. I ascertain that President Clinton named substantial
numbers and percentages of extremely capable women and minorities,
although the Senate did not consider two of the Administration's nominees who had Judiciary Committee hearings, and fifty judicial vacancies
remained when the Senate recessed. 1 The paper correspondingly finds
that the effective selection process applied during President Clinton's first
half-term continued to operate smoothly, as witnessed by the numerous,
highly competent lawyers whom the Administration nominated and
appointed.
I also determine that President Clinton filled many judicial openings
and that he bears little responsibility for the seats that are empty. Moreover, it is important to have on the bench the complete complement of
judges authorized. For example, only that full contingent can satisfactorily expedite the disposition of cases, decrease existing civil backlogs in
numerous districts and ameliorate the pressures which the 1994 crime legislation will impose on the justice system. Ascertaining that the Administration has instituted procedures which could foster the appointment of
additional, very able women and minorities and the elimination of all vacancies, I assess why President Clinton should attempt to achieve this objective and how his Administration might realize that purpose. 2

1. Telephone interview with Deborah Lewis, Alliance for Justice, Washington, D.C.
(Jan. 22, 1995).
2. See Carl Tobias, Increasing Balance on the Federal Bench, 32 Hous. L. REv. 137
(1995); Carl Tobias, Keeping the Covenant on the Federal Courts, 47 SMU L. REv. 1861
(1994). See also Carl Tobias, Rethinking Federal Judicial Selection, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv.
1257; Carl Tobias Closing the Gender Gap on the Federal Courts, 61 U. C1N. L. REv. 1237
(1993); Carl Tobias, More Women Named Federal Judges, 43 FLA. L. REv. 477 (1991); Carl
Tobias, The Gender Gap on the Federal Bench, 19 HOFSTRA L. REv. 171 {1990); Carl
Tobias, The Federal Judiciary Engendered, 5 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 123 {1990).
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RECENT FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION

The recent history of federal judicial selection deserves comparatively
limited analysis in this Essay because that experience has been comprehensively examined elsewhere. 3 The goals articulated, the procedures
followed, the lawyers appointed and the judges' decisionmaking during
the Carter, Reagan and Bush presidencies are treated, as judicial selection by these administrations enhances understanding of President Clinton's performance.
A.

CARTER ADMINISTRATION

President Jimmy Carter was the initial Chief Executive who specifically
promised to increase the numbers and percentages of female and minority federal judges and who implemented affirmative steps to fulfill that
pledge. 4 The most efficacious technique that President Carter employed
was merit-based nominating panels for circuit and district courts, 5 and
these commissions successfully sought, found, and promoted the candidacies of exceptionally competent female and minority attorneys. 6
President Carter's efforts to name very capable women and minorities
proved quite successful. A number of these judges had to meet stricter
standards than other lawyers who were considered and appointed and
seemed better qualified than colleagues chosen through more conventional means,7 while the female and minority judges had qualifications
that equalled those of their predecessors in terms of several significant
criteria. 8 Many of these women and minorities, such as Supreme Court
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Circuit Judges Harry Edwards and Stephanie Seymour, have been excellent judges.9 Their contributions to
3. See, e.g., DAVID O'BRIEN. JUDICIAL RouLETIE: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION (1988); Sheldon Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy: The Final Imprint, 76 JUDICATURE 282 (1993); Carl Tobias, Rethinking Federal
Judicial Selection, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1257, 1258-74.
4. See, e.g., Steve McGonigle, Clinton's Judges Changing Face of Federal Judiciary,
BATON RouGE ADVOCATE, Sept. 4, 1994, at 7B. I rely substantially in this subsection on
Tobias, supra note 3, at 1259-64 and on Elliot E. Slotnick, Judicial Selection: Lowering the
Bench or Raising it Higher?: Affirmative Action and Judicial Selection During the Carter
Administration, I YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 270 (1983); see also infra note 13 and accompanying text (demonstrating the small number of female and minority federal judges).
5. LARRY c. BERKSON & SUSAN B. CARBON, THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE
NOMINATING COMMISSION: ITS MEMBERS, PROCEDURES AND CANDIDATES (1980); ALAN
NEFF, THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE NOMINATING COMMISSIONS: THEIR MEMBERS, PROCEDURES, AND CANDIDATES (1981).
6. See Elaine Martin, Gender and Judicial Selection: A Comparison of the Reagan and
Carter Administrations, 71JUDICATURE136, 141 (1987); Carl Tobias, The Gender Gap on
the Federal Bench, 19 HOFSTRA L. REv. 171, 174 (1990).
7. This is controversial and depends on the definition of qualified. See Slotnick,
supra note 4, at 298.
8. Id. at 280-98; cf. Sheldon Goldman, Should There Be Affirmative Action for the
Judiciary?, 62 JUDICATURE 488, 492-93 (1979) (claiming that female and minority Carter
appointees on whole "may even be more distinguished than ... white males chosen by
Carter and previous administrations").
9. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Keeping the Covenant on the Federal Courts, 47 SMU L. REv.
1861, 1863, 1867 (1994) (Justice Ginsburg and Judge Edwards); Paul Richter & David Sav-
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courts' decisionmaking and to the smooth functioning of the justice system indicate the need for diverse viewpoints, often gleaned from personal
life experiences, which numerous female and minority attorneys bring to
judicial service. 10 The jurists whom President Carter named have been
rather solicitous of individuals' rights and of legislative intent expressed
in statutes, while providing comparatively open court access .to parties
with limited resources. 11
President Carter appointed 41 female lawyers out of 258 judges
(15.9%) during his term of service. 12 These results represented dramatic
improvement over the records of prior administrations. When the Carter
administration came into office, only one woman and two African-Americans out of ninety-seven judges served on courts of appeal and a mere
five women and twenty African-Americans or Latinos out of four hundred were district judges. 1 3
B.

REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

President Ronald Reagan won the 1980 election with what he characterized as a mandate to make the federal government, including the
courts, more conservative. 14 The President proclaimed that his primary
objective in selecting nominees was to make the bench less liberal. 15 The
Chief Executive correspondingly appeared to consider the appointment
of judges a comparatively cost-free way of appealing to conservative elements of the Republican Party.16
age, "Wow" Candidate is Sought for High Court, L.A. TIMES, May 29, 1993, at A18 (mentioning Judge Seymour as possible Supreme Court nominee).
10. See Tobias, supra note 9, at 1867 (discussing Justice Ginsburg's career); id. at 1874
(discussing other values of diversity). The judges' service on the judiciary can also make it
more representative of society. See Tobias, supra note 3, at 1276.
11. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 3, at 1262-63; See also Sheldon Goldman, Carter's Judicial Appointments: A Lasting Legacy, 64 JuoICATURE 345, 355 (1981) (analyzing Carter
appointees' political viewpoints). I appreciate that some observers would find these views
to be indicia of unsuccessful selection. See Tobias, supra note 3, at 1262-64.
12. Sheldon Goldman, Reagan's Judicial Legacy: Completing the Puzzle and Summing
Up, 72 JUDICATURE 318, 322, 325 (1989); Patricia M. Wald, Women in the Law, TRIAL,
Nov. 1988, at 75. President Carter also appointed 37 African-Americans out of 258 judges
(14.3%) in his 4-year tenure. See Goldman, supra at 322, 325. Of the 258 appointees, 16
were Latinos and 2 were Asian-Americans. See ALLIANCE FOR JusTICE, JUDICIAL SELECTION PROJECT, ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1992) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter JSP ANNUAL REPORT]. All recent administrations have increased the numbers and percentages of
women appointed over time. See Carl Tobias, Closing the Gender Gap on the Federal
Courts, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 1237, 1240 (1993).
13. Robert J. Lipshutz and Douglas B. Huron, Achieving A More Representative Federal Judiciary, 62 JUDICATURE 483 (1979); see also Slotnick, supra note 4, at 271. See generally Elaine Martin, Women on the Federal Bench: A Comparative Profile, 65 JUDICATURE
306 (1982).
14. I rely substantially in this subsection on O'BRIEN, supra note 3, at 60-64; Goldman,
supra note 12.
15. See, e.g., O'BRIEN, supra note 3, at 60; Sheldon Goldman, Reagan's Judicial Appointments at Mid-Term: Shaping the Bench in His Own Image, 66 JUDICATURE 335, 337
(1983).
16. See, e.g., Ruth Marcus, Bush Quietly Fosters Conservative Trend in Courts, WASH.
PosT, Feb. 18, 1991, at A4; Neil Lewis, Bush Picking the Kind of Judges Reagan Favored,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1990, at Al. See generally O'BRIEN, supra note 3, at 60-63.
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President Reagan attempted to make the courts less liberal in numerous ways. For instance, he rejected most of the Carter administration's
goals and processes. More specifically, President Reagan eliminated
President Carter's merit-based selection commission for appeals courts
and relied less on the district court panels. 17 The Reagan administration
concomitantly eschewed virtually all special efforts that President Carter
instituted to promote the candidacies of capable female and minority
lawyers. 18
President Reagan employed traditional selection methods, namely senatorial courtesy and patronage, and infrequently consulted with the Senate Judiciary Committee. 19 The Republican Chief Executive and officials
responsible for judicial recruitment also invoked affirmative measures to
make the courts less liberal. For example, personnel who worked on judicial selection sought attorneys with conservative ideological perspectives
and evaluated the opinions of lower court judges to discern whether they
should sit on higher courts.
President Reagan attained his expressly-declared objective of creating
more conservative courts. The lawyers placed on the bench were comparatively homogeneous in terms of gender, race and political viewpoints.
The Republican administration named only 31 women out of 372 judges
(8.3%) throughout its 2 terms. 20 Numerous Reagan appointees have decided cases conservatively. For instance, they have narrowly interpreted
the Constitution and congressional statutes and have limited federal court
access. 21

c.

BUSH ADMINISTRATION

President Bush relied substantially on the Reagan administration's
goals and processes for choosing judges. For example, President Bush
observed, as had Reagan before him, that his principal objective in selecting judges was to make the federal bench more conservative, and he in17. Exec. Order 12,059 § 4(d), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 44 (Supp. 1992), revoked by
Exec. Order 12,305, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 44 (Supp. 1992); Exec. Order 12,097 § 1-104,
reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 133 (Supp. 1992), revoked by Exec. Order 12,553, reprinted in 28
U.S.C. § 133 (Supp. 1992); see also O'BRIEN, supra note 3, at 61.
18. See Martin, supra note 6, at 141; Elliot E. Slotnick, Gender, Affirmative Action and
Recruitment to the Federal Bench, 14 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 519, 545-61 (1984).
19. I rely substantially in this paragraph on O'BRIEN, supra note 3, at 60-62; Goldman
supra note 12, at 319; Lewis, supra note 16; and Tim Weiner, White House Builds Courts in
Its Own Image, PHIL. INQUIRER, Oct. 7, 1990, at Al.
20. Goldman, supra note 12, at 322, 325. African-Americans constituted only 1.9% (7
out of 368) of the attorneys whom President Reagan named in his 2 terms. Id. at 321, 325.
Of 368 lawyers, 13 were Latinos and 2 were Asian-Americans. See JSP ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 12, at 4.
21. Goldman, supra note 12, at 330; cf. Steve Alumbaugh & C.K. Rowland, The Links
Between Platform-Based Appointment Criteria and Trial Judges' Abortion Judgements, 74
JumcATURE 153 (1990) (observing that Reagan appointees are much more likely than
Carter appointees to reject pro-choice abortion claims). See generally O'BRIEN, supra note
3, at 60-64.
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voked senatorial courtesy and patronage.22 But the Bush
administration's purposes and procedures did depart somewhat from
those of its predecessor. Most importantly, President Bush adopted efficacious techniques for appointing highly competent women and minorities to judgeships, but he implemented these measures only after two
years in office and they were less thorough than President Carter's endeavors. 23 Thus, the Republican Chief Executive was able to achieve his
goal of making the courts less liberal; however, some evidence indicates
that the attorneys named are more moderate than the judges whom President Reagan selected. 24 President Bush's appointees were correspondingly more diverse in terms of gender and race. President Bush named 36
female lawyers out of 192 appointees (18.7%) during his term in office. 25
The percentage of women named to the bench in the Bush administration established a record then, although certain factors limit this apparent
success. For example, the Chief Executive selected a number of these
female attorneys after the controversial proceedings to confirm Justice
Clarence Thomas, and also in 1992, when the Bush administration was
desperately seeking reelection.26
III.

JUDICIAL SELECTION DURING THE THIRD YEAR OF
THE CLINTON PRESIDENCY

A.

DATA

In President Clinton's third year in office, he appointed seventeen female lawyers out of fifty-three judges (thirty-two percent) and eight minority attorneys out of fifty-three judges (fifteen percent). 27 The
numbers and percentages of women and minorities whom the Clinton
administration named are completely without precedent; they strikingly
contrast with the judicial selection record of President Reagan and substantially surpass the results attained by the Bush and Carter administrations.28 For example, President Clinton appointed more female judges
during his first three years in office than the Reagan administration
named in two terms and President Bush appointed during four years. 29
22. See, e.g., Letter from President George Bush to Senator Robert Dole (Nov. 30,
1990) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Letter]; Goldman, supra note 3, at 295-97;
Lewis, supra note 16; see also supra notes 14-15, 19 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Letter, supra note 22; Goldman, supra note 3, at 297.
24. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 3, at 295-98; Neil A. Lewis, Selection of Conservative Judges Insures a President's Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1992, at A13.
25. Goldman, supra note 3, at 287, 293; Tobias, supra note 12, at 1237 n.3 and accompanying text; see also supra note 12. African-Americans comprised 5.2% (10 out of 192) of
President Bush's appointees. See Goldman, supra note 3, at 287, 293. Of the 192 judges, 9
were Latinos and 1 was an Asian-American. See JSP ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 12, at
4.
26. Tobias, supra note 12, at 1240-42; see also Tobias, supra note 3, at 1270-74.
27. Lewis interview, supra note 1.
28. See supra notes 12-20, 25 and accompanying text; see also Al Kamen, Vow on Federal Judges Still on Hold, WASH. PosT, Oct. 29, 1993, at A25.
29. See supra notes 20, 25, 27 and accompanying text.

FEDERAL COURT APPOINTMENTS

1996]

315

Indeed, white males have comprised approximately forty percent of the
judges whom the Clinton administration has named. 30
The attorneys whom the Democratic Chief Executive appointed are
exceptionally competent. The lawyers are apparently quite intelligent, industrious, and independent, while they seem to have much integrity and
appropriately-measured judicial temperament. The American Bar Association (ABA) has rated sixty-three percent of President Clinton's nominees as well-qualified, which is ten points higher than the rankings
assigned to Reagan and Bush nominees.3 1
A number of the individuals whom the Clinton administration named
have enjoyed distinguished careers. For instance, A. Wallace Tashima
was a highly-regarded federal district judge in the Central District of California before President Clinton elevated him to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 32 The Clinton administration also appointed to the Seventh Circuit Judge Diane Wood, who had served as a
Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department and as a faculty member at the University of Chicago
Law School.33
The total number of attorneys whom President Clinton has named during his initial 3 years constitutes substantial progress toward filling the
113 judicial vacancies which existed when he assumed office. When Congress recessed in December 1995, fifty openings remained, and the Senate
had not considered for confirmation two Administration nominees. 34
B.

REASONS FOR PRESIDENT CLINTON'S SUCCESS

It is easy to ascertain why President Clinton appointed and nominated
such a large number of highly competent female and minority attorneys
during his third year in office. Perhaps most important, the Chief Executive is keeping the covenant which he made with the citizens of the
United States and effectuating pledges which he took during the presidential campaign.
For instance, Governor Clinton promised during 1992 that he would
name to the courts only women and men who were very intelligent, who
promised to have balanced judicial temperament, and who had evinced
30. Lewis interview, supra note 1; see also Al Kamen, Filling the Robes, WASH. PosT,
Sept. 7, 1994, at A19.
31. Lewis interview, supra note 1; see also DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CLINTON ADMINISTRATION JUDICIAL RECORD, ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS (1994) (hereinafter
1994 DOJ REcoRD] (copy on file with author); Joan Biskupic, Clinton Avoids Activist in
Judicial Selections, WASH. PosT, Oct. 24, 1995, at Al; Henry J. Reske, Judicial Vacancies
Declining, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1994, at 24 (providing Clinton nominee rankings).
32. See, e.g., Steve Albert, Clinton Nominates L.A. Judge for Ninth Circuit, THE RECORDER, Apr. 7, 1995, at 2; Henry Weinstein, Clinton Nominates L.A. Judge to U.S. Appeals Court, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1995, at Bl.
33. See, e.g., Janan Hanna & John O'Brien, Phelan: Firm "Very, Very Viable" Despite
Loss of Key People, CHI. TRIB., July 4, 1995, at B3; John Flynn Rooney, New 7th Circuit
Judge Seen as "More Liberal" Member, CH1. DAILY L. BuLL., July 3, 1995, at 1.
34. Lewis interview, supra note 1.
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concern about, and a commitment to, individual rights which the Constitution protects, while the candidate pledged to increase gender and racial
diversity on the bench. 35 In 1995, the President explained how he had
honored these commitments:
I have made an extra effort ·to look for qualified candidates who
could serve with distinction and make a contribution to this country
and make the Federal bench reflective of the American population.
I have not done it with any quota system in mind, and I have not
guaranteed anybody a job.36
During the third year of the Clinton administration. those responsible
for judicial selection carefully implemented the President's promises,
even as the pace of nomination and confirmation slowed considerably in
comparison with 1994.37 The United States Senate judiciously exercised
its advice and consent authority. Numerous senators were responsive to
the Clinton administration's goals in choosing judges and cooperated with
President Clinton and his assistants. Quite a few senators correspondingly used or revived district court nominating commissions to designate,
and foster the candidacies of, very competent female and minority attorneys, while the senators forwarded the names of many women and
minorities.
The president generally relied on practices for selecting nominees
which were similar to the procedures employed by the Carter administration; however, these measures differed minimally from President Bush's
mechanisms and only partially from the techniques used by President
Reagan. 38 Officials in the White House and the Department of Justice
shared responsibility for choosing candidates. White House employees
participated more actively in identifying nominees than Justice Department personnel, who assumed primary responsibility for scrutinizing lawyers' professional qualifications after their designation as serious
candidates. 39
35. See, e.g., William J. Clinton, Judiciary Suffers Racial, Sexual Lack of Balance,
NAT'L L.J., Nov. 2, 1992, at 15-16 (providing promise and pledge); Bush v. Clinton: The
Candidates on Legal Issues, 78 AB.A. J. Oct. 1992, at 57-58 (providing promise and
pledge); see also Stephen Labaton, Clinton May Use Diversity Pledge to Remake Courts,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1993, at Al (providing pledge).
36. Excerpts from the President's News Conference, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1995, at A9.
President Clinton also named so many highly-qualified women and minorities because he
apparently has views on the courts and has relied upon selection objectives and procedures
which resemble those of President Carter more than those of his two Republican predecessors. See Tobias, supra note 3, at 1258-74; Tobias, supra note 9, at 1868.
37. I rely substantially in this paragraph on Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Selection Under
Clinton: A Midterm Examination, 78 JUDICATURE 276, 290 (1995).
38. Tobias, supra note 3, at 1258-74. This sentence and much in the remainder of this
subsection are premised substantially on the author's personal conversations with individuals who are knowledgeable about the selection procedures that the Clinton administration
employed, and on Goldman, supra note 37, at 278-79.
39. Goldman, supra note 37, at 278-79; Ruth Marcus, Judge in Line for White House
Counsel Post, WASH. PosT, Aug. 9, 1994, at A7; Chris Reidy, Clinton Gets His Turn, BosTON GLOBE, Aug. 8, 1993, at 69; conversations supra note 38; see also Goldman, supra note
3, at 285 (suggesting that Clinton administration White House had assumed responsibility
similar to Bush administration White House).
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The Judicial Selection Group, which the White House Counsel chairs
and which consists of White House and Department of Justice staff, held
weekly meetings. 40 During those sessions, members of the entity designated the practitioners whom President Clinton should consider, which
potential nominees required additional investigation and how best to balance the goal of suggesting the most competent individuals with political
practicalities. 41 . The White House Counsel recommended to the Chief
Executive one or more persons for each vacancy. 42 The President himself
was actively involved in the process of choosing nominees, being consulted during several phases, and occasionally proposing names or requesting additional possibilities.43
Senatorial patronage and courtesy were significant to the identification
of nominees for the district courts, while the Clinton administration exercised ongoing deference to senators who represent the states in which the
judicial openings arose. 44 Most senators suggested the names of several
attorneys from whom the Chief Executive eventually chose a nominee.
The president also supported the use of district court nominating panels
which numerous senators employed.45 The White House retained greater
control over the choice of appellate court nominees; however, President
Clinton was receptive to the views of senators from the geographic regions in which the judges would be stationed.4 6
The Chief Executive and his aides informally consulted on candidates
with the Senate Judiciary Committee, which has primary responsibility
for the confirmation process, and with individual senators before formally
nominating lawyers and seeking Senate approval. 47 Senator Orrin Hatch
(R-Utah), the Chair of the Judiciary Committee, treated President Clinton's nominees rather similarly to the way that Senator Joseph Biden (RDel.), his predecessor, handled the Reagan administration's nominees
during the third year of its second term. 48 For instance, the Judiciary
Committee voted favorably on all nominees, although some candidates
40. Goldman, supra note 37, at 278-79; conversations, supra note 38.
41. Goldman, supra note 37, at 279; see also Joan Biskupic, Despite 129 Clinton Appointments, GOP Judges Dominate U.S. Bench, WASH. PosT, Oct. 16, 1994, at A20.
42. Goldman, supra note 37, at 279.
43. See id.; U.S. Bench Looks More Like U.S.: Clinton Raises Ratio of Women, Minority Judges, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 24, 1994, at A9.
44. David A. Andelman, Justice Affirmed: Clinton Administration Appointments to
Federal Courts, MGMT. REv., June 1994, at 34; Neil A. Lewis, Clinton is Considering Judgeships for Opponents of Abortion Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1993, at Al; Michael York,
Clout Sought in Choosing U.S. Judges, WASH. PosT, Feb. 5, 1993, at D3; see also conversations supra note 38.
45. Neil A. Lewis, Unmaking the G.O.P. Court Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1993, at
AlO; see also supra note 6 and accompanying text; conversations supra note 38.
46. Andelman, supra note 44, at 34; Reidy, supra note 39, at 69. The Clinton administration has not reinstituted the Circuit Judge Nominating Commission employed during
the Carter administration. See also supra note 5 and accompanying text. President Clinton
maintained substantial responsibility for selecting his Administration's first two Supreme
Court Justices and will actively participate in choosing future High Court nominees.
47. Conversations, supra note 38.
48. Neil A. Lewis, New Chief of Judiciary Panel May Find an Early Test With Clinton,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1994, at A31; see also Carl Tobias, Forum: Dear Judge Mikva, 1994
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whom the majority party considered politically unpalatable may have
never been formally nominated.
Immediately after the 1994 elections, Senator Hatch reportedly stated
that the Committee would approve nominees who were "qualified, in
good health, and understand the role of judges,"4 9 and this is what essentially happened. Senator Hatch concomitantly admonished that the
Committee might reject controversial nominees;50 however, the Clinton
administration apparently forwarded the names of very few nominees
who could be so characterized. 51 Senator Hatch asked some candidates
their views on substantive issues, such as affirmative action and governmental takings of private property. 52 The nominees were not troubled by
the queries and answered them, but some observers have described the
questions as analogues of litmus tests that were criticized in the 1980s.53
President Clinton formally submitted names at a steady pace, while the
Judiciary Committee held hearings on one circuit court nominee and several district court nominees per month. 54 Senator Conrad Bums (R-Mt.)
imposed holds on all nominees to the Ninth Circuit until Congress split
that appeals court,and this effort succeeded until Senator Bums removed
the holds in early January, 1996; but the entire Senate rejected this
request. 55
The President and his assistants continued earlier efforts to seek, find
and nominate very competent female and minority lawyers. 56 Prominent
administration officials expressly and forcefully declared that the appointment of talented women and minorities was quite important, while numerous personnel who participate in judicial recruitment, such as
Attorney General Janet Reno are female or minority attorneys. Quite a
Wis. L. REv. 1579; Neil A. Lewis, Partisan Gridlock Blocks Senate Confirmation of Federal
Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1995, at Al6.
49. Lewis, supra note 48, at A31.
50. Id.
51. Biskupic, supra note 31; Joan Biskupic, Facing Fights on Court Nominees, Clinton
Yields, WASH. PosT, Feb. 13, 1995, at A23; Ana Puga, Clinton Judicial Picks May Court the
Right, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 29, 1994, at 1; see also Al Kamen, A Nominee of Peculiar
Qualifications, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 1995, at A23; Eva M. Rodriguez, Blowin' in the Wind,
LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 27, 1995, at 6.
52. Joan Biskupic, Flap Over Hatch's Questions to Judicial Nominees/Democrats
Worry About Creation of "Litmus Test'', S.F. CHRON., Mar. 13, 1995, at AS.
53. Biskupic, supra note 52; see also Sheldon Goldman, Reagan's Second Term Judicial
Appointments: The Battle at Midway, 70 JUDICATURE 324, 326 (1987) (discussing idea of
litmus tests). See generally Goldman, supra note 12, at 320.
54. Al Kamen, Window Closing on Judicial Openings, WASH. PosT, June 12, 1995, at
A17.
55. See, e.g., Court Watch: Partisan Game, L.A. TIMES, June 23, 1995, at B8; Montana
Senator Tries to Force Court Breakup, SEATTLE TIMES, June 11, 1995, at Bl. See generally
Carl Tobias, The Impoverished Idea of Circuit-Splitting, 44 EMORY L.J. - 1995.
56. The Administration had previously urged senators to transmit the names of female
and minority lawyers and to rely on current, or revive earlier, district nominating commissions, some of which panels senators voluntarily revitalized. A senior White House official
said in 1993 that "we have spoken to each and every Democrat in the Senate and told them
we expect the recommendations to include women and minorities." Lewis, supra note 45,
at AlO; see also McGonigle, supra note 4, at 8B.
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few senators were also predisposed to search for, discover and recommend female and minority candidates. Administration officials responsible for judicial selection and these senators solicited, and depended upon,
the assistance and suggestions for potential nominees, of such nontraditional sources, as women's organizations, public interest groups, and minority political organizations.57
Certain information suggests that the Clinton administration evidenced
a somewhat decreased willingness to nominate candidates who might
prove politically controversial. Illustrative were the decisions against resubmitting the names of an attorney and a state court judge who were
nominated to district court seats in California during 1994. 58 White
House Counsel Abner Mikva correspondingly observed that the Administration would not support candidates when "objections are raised that
mean [nominees] won't get hearings or that we will end up with a fight
that looks like it won't go anywhere" while emphasizing that "we're still
looking for the best people we can get. "59
The reluctance to pursue the confirmation of controversial nominees
may be an advisable caution reflecting political pragmatism. After all, a
prolonged confirmation battle over one controversial candidate could
threaten the President's opportunity to fill the federal bench. 60 Indeed,
Professor Goldman found it "reasonable to expect that [the Administration] will neither provoke a fight with Republicans, nor will it wish to
exhaust political resources on confirmation battles assuming there is a
level of reasonableness on the part of the Republican leadership. "61
It is also important to understand that President Clinton and his aides
have consistently maintained that they are according less significance to
increasing political balance on the courts than to naming highly competent women and minorities. During 1995, the Administration seemed
committed to placing additional female and minority lawyers on the
bench. The slight decline in the numbers and percentages of women and
minorities appointed, however, may reflect a modicum of compromise
and greater willingness to name more moderate appointees.
In short, the President enjoyed considerable success when choosing
judges during 1995. The Clinton administration named substantial numbers and percentages of very capable female and minority attorneys, continuing to surpass the efforts of Presidents Reagan, Bush and Carter. The
Chief Executive and his aides articulated clear goals for appointing
57. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
58. Biskupic, supra note 51; Puga, supra note 51; see also supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
59. Biskupic, supra note 51, at Al; infra note 92 and accompanying text; see also
Henry J. Reske, A New White House Counsel, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1994, at 32; Mikva Moves
from Courthouse to White House, THE THIRD BRANCH, Sept. 1994, at 1.
60. Carl Tobias, Increasing Balance on The Federal Bench, 32 Haus. L. REv. 137, 156
(1995).
61. Goldman, supra note 37, at 291.
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judges and applied efficacious selection processes, particularly for identifying and naming highly-competent female and minority lawyers.
This success is more impressive in light of the difficulties which the
Clinton administration confronted during its third year of service. Perhaps most important were the complications posed by Republican Party
control of both the Senate and the House. This meant that President
Clinton and his staff had to expend considerable time, effort and energy
in responding to political initiatives, such as the Contract with America,
and reforms involving, for instance, the budget, public assistance and the
legal system. 62 International issues, particularly implicating Bosnia, also
required substantial commitments of Administration resources.
The Chief Executive and his assistants also faced problems that were
more directly related to judicial selection. Because President Clinton's
political party constituted a minority of the Senate, efforts to facilitate the
nomination and confirmation of judicial candidates were complicated.
For example, Senator Hatch controlled the scheduling of Judiciary Committee hearings on nominees, while Senator Robert Dole (R-Kan.), the
majority leader, was responsible for scheduling floor votes on candidates
whom the Committee approved. 63 A consideration that apparently assumed increasing significance throughout 1995 was the possibility that the
Republican Party might win the 1996 presidential election and, therefore,
recapture the right to make judicial appointments.
Additional important problems, including a few which involved the
White House Counsel's Office and the Justice Department, may also have
distracted personnel responsible for judicial selection in the White House
and the Department of Justice. A significant illustration was the ongoing
Whitewater investigations being performed by the independent counsel
and by Congress, which deflected the attention of White House staff, particularly lawyers in the Office of White House Counsel. Similarly distracting were congressional probes into the Administration's handling of
the volatile situations at Waco and Ruby Ridge.
Notwithstanding the admirable efforts of the Clinton administration,
fifty judicial openings remained and the Senate Judiciary Committee had
not considered two nominees for confirmation when Congress recessed
during December 1995.64 Once the second session of the 104th Congress
convened in January 1995, there were fifty judicial vacancies. 65
In sum, President Clinton and his aides enjoyed significant success during the third year in office, given the substantial complications which they
62. See Republican Contract With America, Sept. 28, 1994, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Hottop File. See generally William P. Marshall, Federalization: A Critical Overview, 44 DEPAUL L. REv. 719 (1995); Carl Tobias, Common Sense and Other Legal Reforms, 48 VAND. L. REv. 699 (1995).
63. See supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text. Senator Dole's presidential aspirations may have additionally complicated judicial selection. See Kamen, supra note 54, at
Al 7; see also supra note 55 and accompanying text.
·
64. Lewis interview, supra note 1.
65. Id.
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faced. The Clinton administration should attempt to achieve even more
in the future, although it will confront considerably greater difficulty, particularly because 1996 is an election year. Nevertheless, the Administration must try to accomplish more by continuing to depend on the judicial
selection goals and processes described above and by effectuating several
recommendations given in the next section.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
A.

WHY MORE WOMEN AND MINORITIES SHOULD BE APPOINTED

The reasons why the Clinton administration should appoint and nominate additional very able female and minority lawyers to federal judgeships deserve relatively limited discussion here. They have been
examined above and have been thoroughly explored elsewhere. 66 The
resources that President Clinton and his staff devoted to finding, nominating and naming highly capable women and minorities concomitantly
demonstrate their understanding that these are significant priorities.
One of the most important reasons for placing more highly qualified
female and minority lawyers on the federal courts is the different perspective which most of these attorneys will bring to the bench. The lawyers
may increase their colleagues' comprehension of complicated policy questions, such as abortion and affirmative action, which the judiciary must
treat. 67 Appointing additional women and minorities could also reduce
gender and racial prejudice in the federal courts. 68 Some evidence concomitantly suggests that the populace has greater confidence in a federal
judiciary whose constitution more closely resembles that of American society. 69 Naming more female and minority practitioners to the federal
bench70 is also an important sign of a presidential administration's commitment to enhancing circumstances for women and minorities in the nation, in the federal courts, and in the legal profession. 71
66. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 8; Martin, supra note 6; Slotnick, supra note 4.
67. See, e.g., Marion Z. Goldberg, Carter-Appointed Judges - Perspectives on Gender;
TRIAL, Apr. 1990, at 108; Goldman, supra note 8, at 494; Slotnick, supra note 4, at 272.
68. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 169 (Apr. 2, 1990); Lynn
H. Schafran, Gender Bias in the Courts: An Emerging Focus For Judicial Reform, 21 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 237, 238, 271-73 (1989). See generally PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE (1992).
69. Tobias, supra note 3, at 1276; see also Slotnick, supra note 4, at 272-73. Research
also suggests that numerous female and minority judges might enhance substantive decisionmaking. See Jon Gottschall, Carter's Judicial Appointments: The Influence of Affirmative Action and Merit Selection on Voting on the U.S. Court of Appeals, 67 JUDICATURE 165,
168 (1983); Donald R. Songer et al., A Reappraisal of Diversification in the Federal Courts:
Gender Effects in the Court of Appeals, 56 J. PoL'Y 425 (1994); see also Elaine Martin, Men
and Women on the Bench: Vive la Difference?, 73 JumcATURE 204, 208 (1990). But cf.
supra note 11 (acknowledging that this claim is controversial). A number of these judges,
including Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and Justice Thurgood Marshall, have rendered
distinguished service.
70. Tobias, supra note 12, at 1244; Carl Tobias, More Women Named Federal Judges, 43
FLA. L. REv. 477, 483 (1991).
71. Tobias, supra note 6, at 176; Tobias, supra note 67, at 483; see also Carl Tobias, The
D.C. Circuit as a National Court, 48 U. MIAMI L. REv. 159, 175-76 (1993).
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An additional telling reason for appointing more female and minority
attorneys is the need to remedy the lack of gender, racial and political
balance on the present federal bench, sixty percent of whose members
were named by Presidents Reagan and Bush. Fewer than two percent of
Reagan appointees were African-Americans, while President Bush
named one Asian-American and only nine Latinos. 72 Moreover, Republican appointees were seemingly named principally because they held
conservative political perspectives.73
The failure of the Reagan and Bush administrations to appoint more
female and minority judges is troubling because they had much bigger,
more experienced, pools of female and minority practitioners on which to
draw than did President Carter. For example, there were 62,000 women
in the profession during 1980 but 140,000 in 1988.74 Numerous female
attorneys have actively participated in rigorous legal practices. 75 The
number of African-American, Latino and Asian-American lawyers concomitantly increased from 23,000 to 51,000 between 1980 and 1989, while
these attorneys have been engaged in a broad range of equally challenging legal work.76
Another important reason to name additional female and minority
judges is the need to fill all current vacancies so that the federal courts
will have the complete complement of judges authorized. Appointing
practitioners to those openings would help the courts resolve cases more
efficiently and decrease the district courts' substantial civil backlogs. 77
Indeed, during April 1995, Guy Zoghby, the President of the American
Judicature Society, requested that President Clinton and Republican
members of the Senate "make a bipartisan commitment to fill judicial
vacancies promptly [because those openings] threaten the federal courts'
ability to resolve Americans' disputes fairly and interpret the law
justly."78

72. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
73. Tobias, supra note 3, at 1264-74; see also Tobias, supra note 6, at 179-80.
74. See Tobias, supra note 12, at 1241 n.22.
75. Id. at 1246-47; Tobias, supra note 3, at 1280-81; see also Tobias, supra note 70, at
485. They have worked, for instance, at the Justice Department, public interest groups,
and large law firms. See Tobias, supra note 12, at 1246-47; Tobias, supra note 9, at 1875.
76. JSP ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 3. For example, they have pursued
landmark civil rights suits, practiced criminal law, or written pathbreaking legal scholarship. See Tobias, supra note 3, at 1280-81; Tobias, supra note 9, at 1875.
77. For instance, on March 31, 1994, there were 219,424 civil cases pending, and 14,658
had been pending for over three years. See ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, JUDICIAL SELECTION
PROJECT Mm-YEAR REPORT 4 (1994) (copy on file with author); see also David G. Savage,
Clinton Missing Opportunity on Court Vacancies, Some Say, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1993, at
A5 (suggesting civil cases backlogged because of judge shortage). Implementation of the
1994 crime legislation will worsen these problems by increasing the criminal docket. See
Violent Crime Control and Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796
(1994).
78. Letter from Guy A. Zoghby, President, American Judicature Soc'y, to Editors,
NAT'L L.J., Apr. 3, 1995, at 20; see generally Tobias, note 60, at 153.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR APPOINTING MORE WOMEN AND
MINORITIES

Suggestions for how the Clinton administration can appoint more very
capable female and minority lawyers to the bench warrant relatively brief
treatment here. A number of analogous recommendations have been
made elsewhere,79 and some are afforded above, while the Chief Executive and his assistants are clearly already committed to naming additional
women and minorities and have instituted effective processes for achieving this goal.
A few suggestions can be offered, nonetheless. President Clinton and
his aides could consider means of redoubling efforts to search for, identify
and appoint more highly competent women and minorities. The Chief
Executive and administration employees should expand their aggressive
efforts to name female and minority practitioners, exploring new ways of
proceeding and invoking formerly untapped resources.
The choice of Supreme Court Justices and appeals court judges deserve
comparatively limited examination because the White House has retained
considerable responsibility for nominees to those courts. 80 The President
and the White House Counsel, accordingly, will essentially need to guarantee that White House personnel responsible for judicial selection, who
should be quite loyal employees, understand the importance of appointing additional female and minority lawyers and use the best procedures for realizing this objective. Experience over the Clinton
administration's initial three years suggests that these individuals appreciate this goal and have implemented very efficacious processes.
The objectives and practices for appointing district court judges require
closer analysis because, in making such appointments, the President has
deferred to senators from the locales in which the judges will sit. 81 Senators' concerns or the Administration's encouragement has apparently
prompted many senators to undertake, or continue to employ, mechanisms for designating and promoting the candidacies of quite talented female and minority lawyers and to tender the names of numerous women
and minorities. President Clinton might consider praising those senators
who have helped him attain his judicial selection goals, while urging the
remaining senators to initiate analogous efforts.
The Chief Executive could repeat once again in an important public
forum his clear commitment to appointing greater numbers of well qualified female and minority lawyers. The president might even write specifically· to senators, enlisting their aid in tendering the names of women and

79. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 12, at 1245-49; Tobias, supra note 3, at 1274-85. See
generally Goldman, supra note 37.
80. See supra note 46 and accompanying text
81. See supra note 44 and accompanying text
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minorities82 and in implementing measures, such as nominating commissions, which will search for and foster the appointment of these
practitioners. 83
Presidential staff working on judicial selection and members of the
Senate should correspondingly ask for the input and assistance of other
sources who will know about able female and minority attorneys. They
should also work closely with Senator Hatch and the entire Committee
by, for example, consulting on potential nominees. In addition, administration personnel and senators ought to contact traditional sources, such
as bar associations, that could afford some assistance. More important
will be less conventional entities, such as women's groups or minority
political organizations. The Clinton administration also must seek the
assistance of all of the female senators, who can convince their colleagues
to suggest more women and minorities, thereby helping President Clinton
to foster potential nominees' candidacies.
The qualifications and networking abilities of female and minority attorneys, who now comprise more than one-quarter of practicing lawyers
in the nation, will be crucial to the effort. As important could be the
endeavors and contacts of women and minorities in the Cabinet, such as
Attorney General Janet Reno; of female and minority officials throughout the federal government; and of Hillary Rodham Clinton, who chaired
the American Bar Association Commission on Women in the
Profession. 84
C.

RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING MORE SPECIFICALLY TO

1996

The Clinton administration enjoyed considerable success in appointing
a significant number of very capable women and minorities to the federal
bench and in filling numerous judicial vacancies during 1995. The pace of
confirmation was somewhat slower than in 1994, as might have been expected and as some federal court observers predicted, partly because the
Republican Party controlled the Senate and the Judiciary Committee. 85
President Clinton and his assistants must foresee and prepare for difficulties that will arise in 1996, problems which the presidential election year
will certainly exacerbate.
Professor Goldman recently admonished that "predictions can be hazardous, especially in a volatile political climate." 86 Nonetheless, it is possible to posit reasonably reliable prognostications and to afford
suggestions by drawing upon relevant precedents, while attempting to allow for the peculiar circumstances of 1996, and extrapolating into the fu82. President Bush wrote a similar letter. See supra note 22; see also supra note 56
(quoting White House official who stated that the Administration had encouraged all
Democratic senators to support women and minorities).
83. See supra notes 45, 57 and accompanying text.
84. Tobias, supra note 12, at 1248-49.
85. See also Goldman, supra note 37, at 290-91 (predicting slower pace); Tobias, supra
note 60, at 156.
86. Goldman, supra note 37, at 290.
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ture. The most applicable analogue seems to be 1988 because it was an
election year, President Reagan's final year as Chief Executive, and a
time when the opposition political party controlled the Senate. Senator
Biden, as Judiciary Chair, expeditiously and equitably processed the Reagan administration's circuit and district court nominees. 87 In fairness,
1992 is probably the next most relevant precedent, as it also was an election year, President Bush's last year in the White House, and a period
when Democrats remained a majority in the Senate. During 1992, the
Senate confirmed sixty-six Bush administration nominees; however, the
Judiciary Committee conducted no confirmation hearings for fifty-four
additional attorneys whose names the Chief Executive submitted. 88
Senator Hatch now appears likely to continue processing President
Clinton's nominees at the 1995 pace for some portion of 1996, perhaps
until the Democratic and Republican national conventions convene. The
Judiciary Chair seems to be showing his respect for tradition involving the
confirmation process, appears cognizant of the two recent precedents examined above, and seems attentive to the need for having the full complement of federal judges authorized on the bench. 89 At some time
during 1996, however, Senate consideration of nominees will slow dramatically and eventually cease. Even if Senator Hatch is willing to continue processing candidates, the Republican Party leadership will
increasingly pressure him to leave a number of vacancies in the hopes
that the Republican presidential candidate could fill them.
President Clinton and those staff members whose duties encompass judicial selection should consider several recommendations for responding
to the election year scenario that I projected above. The Democratic
Chief Executive and those personnel ought to continue working as
closely as possible with Senator Hatch, especially by consulting him on
candidates; with Judiciary Committee members, particularly other
Republicans and Senator Biden; and with additional senators who can be
of assistance because, for instance, they represent states where the judges
will sit.
Should Senator Hatch resist these overtures or threaten to delay or halt
the confirmation process prematurely, Administration officials could remind the Judiciary Chair of his predecessor's relative solicitude for nominees whom Presidents Reagan and Bush tendered during 1988 and 1992,
respectively. 90 In the unlikely event that Senator Hatch slows or stops
judicial selection early in 1996, President Clinton might take the question
to the American people, or even make it an election issue.
The Chief Executive and assistants with judicial selection responsibilities should anticipate, and plan immediately for, the president's participa87. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
88. Kamen, supra note 54, at A17 (stating that 66 nominees were confirmed); Jerry
Gray, Dole Defends Threat to Bar a Vote on Surgeon General, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1995, at
A20 (stating that 54 nominees received no hearing).
89. See supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
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tion in his re-election campaign. Throughout 1996, that involvement will
increasingly grow, preoccupy the Chief Executive, and distract his attention from naming judges. As general propositions, therefore, President
Clinton might consider participating somewhat less actively in judicial selection and entrusting greater responsibil~ty to his closest advisors, such
as Judge Mikva, who have accumulated substantial expertise in identifying promising candidates and facilitating their appointment. 91
More specifically, the Chief Executive and his aides must insure that
they supply the Senate with a substantial number of nominees, thereby
countering the possibility that candidates would not be confirmed because the Judiciary Committee has insufficient nominees to process. This
means that the White House must transmit the names of as many nominees as possible to the Senate when it convenes in January 1996 and must
guarantee that the Committee has ample numbers of nominees for as
long as the Senate is willing to consider them.
The Clinton administration should continue following its 1995 practices
of forwarding to the Senate extremely competent nominees, of eschewing
reliance on gender or racial quotas, and of avoiding fights over controversial candidates which could jeopardize the opportunity to appoint the
maximum number of judges. 92 Perhaps the most difficult question that
President Clinton must confront is whether, and if so how much, he is
willing to deemphasize the objectives of enhancing gender and racial balance to fill all of the current openings.
This query cannot be definitively answered for several reasons. The
question implicates a complex mix of variables. Some, including the identities of 1996 presidential candidates, defy accurate prediction. Others,
such as the possibility of an international conflict, are unforeseeable. The
preferable approach, therefore, may require case-specific analysis of the
present judicial vacancies and future openings as they occur and the establishment of certain priorities. Setting priorities could implicate, for instance, particular vacancies' relative significance in terms of the number
of openings in specific circuits and districts, those courts' existing
caseloads and backlogs, and the ease with which the seats can be filled.
Several courts afford more concrete examples. Illustrative is the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
which is widely regarded as the country's second most important court
and as closely divided ideologically. The circuit currently has one vacancy. The court's significance means that the need to fill this opening
probably warrants rather high priority, even as the seat's very importance
91. See supra notes 27-65 and accompanying text. The president might also consider
entrusting more responsibility to others, such as senators who represent states in which
vacancies arise for district court seats.
92. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text. President Clinton and Administration officials had earlier suggested that they considered the competence of candidates more
important than their ideology. See, e.g., supra notes 36, 41, 50-51, 58-59; see also Biskupic,
supra note 51.
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might require some flexibility concerning the nominee's political
perspectives. 93
The Ninth Circuit offers an equally instructive, if relatively complicated, example. The appeals court is considered among the most liberal
circuits, includes approximately equal numbers of judges whom Democratic and Republican presidents have appointed, and has three vacancies. The comparative facility with which Judge Tashima and Judge
Sidney Thomas secured Senate approval in 1996 can be ascribed to several considerations which inform understanding of the confirmation process. For instance, Judge Tashima rendered distinguished service on the
Central District of California for fifteen years and reportedly enjoys a
close personal relationship with Senator Hatch. 94 Judge Thomas concomitantly was a highly-competent practitioner and was an active participant
in Democratic Party politics, while his moderate political perspectives
made him rather uncontroversial.95
In comparison, Professor William Fletcher has encountered greater difficulty in being confirmed because he was perceived as relatively controversial, as possessing less centrist viewpoints, and as President Clinton's
friend, and also because of the complications created by Senator Burns's
imposition of holds on all Ninth Circuit nominees. 96 These factors suggest that the Administration might assign a comparatively low priority to
filling the remaining Ninth Circuit seat, unless this can be felicitously
achieved. President Clinton and his assistants should proceed, if they can
easily identify a very capable, uncontroversial candidate whom the senators from the state which has the opening would strongly support and
Senator Hatch would favor.
When considering openings on the district courts, the Chief Executive
and his assistants may want to consult numerous relevant phenomena.
For example, they could target districts which have substantial backlogs
and numerous vacancies, as the need to alleviate docket pressures should
facilitate appointments. In searching for and designating strong candidates, the Administration might emphasize gender and racial diversity
and competence in terms of ability to reduce backlogs. This means that
women and minorities who have served as magistrate judges or state
court trial judges and who have demonstrated their effectiveness in expe93. The Administration apparently recognized these ideas when it nominated Merrick
Garland, who is viewed as a centrist, rather than Peter Edelman, who is perceived to be
quite liberal. See Biskupic, supra note 31; Kamen, supra note 51; Kamen, supra note 54;
Lewis, supra note 48; Rodriguez, supra note 51.
94. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., Max Baucus, Sid Thomas Will Bring Montana Values to the Ninth Circuit,
MoNT. LAWYER, June 1995, at 8; Carl Tobias, SENATOR BAucus' PICK ABSOLUTELY Ex.
CELLENT, Billings Gazette, June 4, 1995, at 9.
96. See, e.g., Court Suffers as Political Games Roll On, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1995, at B;
Reynolds Holding, Clinton Nominates Friend for U.S. Appeals Court, S.F. CHRON., Apr.
27, 1995, at A18; Henry Weinstein, Law Professor Nominated for Key Judgeship, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 27, 1995, at A3; see also supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing
Senator Burns's attempt).
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diting litigation's resolution would be the type of nominees who could
rather easily win confirmation.
V.

CONCLUSION

President Clinton compiled an excellent record of judicial selection
during his third year of service. He clearly delineated the Administration's goals in naming judges and relied on effective processes for achieving the objectives. The Chief Executive appointed numerous highly
competent female and minority attorneys while significantly reducing the
number of judicial openings. If the president and his aides renew their
efforts and carefully work with senators on both sides of the aisle, the
Administration should be able to name considerably more very capable
women and minorities and fill the vacancies during 1996.

